Approaching the language of politics in a Cognitive manner

The title implies the non-literal use of language of politics and will focus on the metonymic use of /here/ and /there/ in speeches from the Hellenic Parliament; in other words I will argue on schematic transformations of the metonymic models of /edo/ and /eki/. The analysis will not be based on a discourse approach, rather on a cognitive one. 


Politics like all spheres of social activity, has its own code, a term used by linguists to refer to a language 
           variety of a particular group. The cognitive process that relates literal meanings to extended       
            meanings is known as mapping. Mapping is the projection of one set of conceptual entities 
            onto another set of conceptual shifts. We mentally trace a path from a conceptually salient   
            conceptual entity to another conceptual entity. I.e.) /πως φτάσαμε ως εδώ/ à politicians/ 
            economic situation The notion of salient/ saliency is a reference point which allows to access     
            another conceptual entity, the target.

Speakers are likely to employ hyperbole in the course of what can broadly be considered political activities. Metaphor and metonymy act as mechanisms to bring the audience to see the facts at issue in the way the speakers want them to see these facts.“When the speaker senses the possibility that the members of the audience have a value which will work to his/hers advantage, if he/she can stimulate them to experience a fantasy concerning the consequences of the facts as he/she wants them seem, the probability of hyperbole being used increases even more” (Swartz; 1976:113).

Since we are dealing with political speech the conceptualization of time and place in virtue of metonymy is grounded by the relation of a situation to the experience of the speaker. The speaker is the reference point of time and place. Temporal cognition is one aspect of conceptual structure which relates to our conceptualization of time. Unlike space, time is not a concrete or physical sensory experience. Temporal experience is both phenomenologically real and subjective. Subjective experience of time is not a single unitary phenomenon; it is compromised of experiences such as our ability to access & perceive duration, simultaneity and points of time.

The spatio-temporal anchoring of our language is not only the basis of our understanding of linguistic messages, but also the basis for anticipating certain kinds of linguistic messages. We locate entities and situations spatially and each of these expressions carries a different degree of explicitness in the encoding referents of the world. Explicitness incorporates the weighted relevance of various conceived elements of the situation with respect to the communicative intent of the speaker.

Talmy (1983) and Langacker (1986, 1988) observed that the way we locate objects with respect to one another involves the recognition of some kind of asymmetrical relation between the object we want to locate and the object with respect to which we locate it. According to them, asymmetrical relations are recognized with respect to size, containment, support, orientation, order, direction, distance, motion, or a combination of these. For Svorou (1993) a spatial-arrangement of two entities may be described in a number of ways, each of which constitutes a ‘construal’.

Examples:

1. "Εμείς είμαστε εδώ και θα παραμείνουμε εδώ, ενώ εσείς είστε και θα παραμείνετε εκεί"

/ekei/ in this context means ‘away from’; according to Talmy it refers to the motion of a schematically Figure along a path that progressively increases its distance from a schematically pointlike Ground. 

2. «Πώς φτάσαμε ως εδώ»

The utterance is a part of a political debate in the Hellenic Parliament. One representative of a political party elaborates on argumentation against the insufficient politics of the other political party. Despite the fact that the intended referent is not explicitly mentioned (the politician instead of using the personal pronoun, uses edo) the conveyed message is understood by the hearer since, a new politial conversation arised [Μιλάτε εσείς για το πώς φτάσαμε εδώ]

Thus, Time and Space are the starting points to conceptualize the metonymic uses of /edo/ & /ekei/. We cannot separate time from space in order to argue for metonymic alteration. The dominant image schema is that of container, part-whole and vice versa, diversion and splitting since the examples were drawn from political debates between the representatives of the political parties in the Hellenic Parliament. 

This brief paper is a part of a conference presentation, which will take place in Belgium, 2011. 

Critical Realism in the New Capitalism: Overdetermination, Transdisciplinarity and Citizenship

Capitalism has the capacity to overcome crisis by radically transforming itself periodically so that economic growth and profitability can continue; by virtue of such a transformation towards 'New Capitalism' the modification of restructuring relations between economic, political and social domains occurred.

The common idea of new capitalism as a 'knowledge-based' socio-economic order implies that it is also discourse-driven. The significance of language in these transformations endow with the performative power to bring into the very realities  of globalization, governance, flexibility and employability. Global space is represented as an entity, a place, 'the modern world' and it is a participant, rather than a circumstance. It is the passive subject and the logical object, which functions as an intermediate stretch of time which includes both pre and post-dates.

In Critical Discourse, interdiscursive analysis of texts is the mediating level of analysis, which is crucial in to integrating social and linguistic analysis. Under the manner of 'semiosis' social practices are networked so that to describe a particular social field. Social change is change in the networking and therefore, scalar changes in relations between global, regional, national and local  configurations, discourses and styles.

A language defines a certain potential, certain possibilities and at the same time excludes others. But texts as elements of social events are not simply the effects of potentials defined by languages. They exhibit intermediate organizational entities of a specifically linguistic sort; hence, they manifest the linguistic moments of networks of social practices like orders of discourse.

Read it Believe it!! Polysemy and Metonymy: The in-between point in conceptualizing discourse.

*Discourse refers to language produced by its users, interaction is implied and it further extends to cover longer stretches of language, rather than only sentences and utterances. This means that discourse is something broad and diverse as it is applied both to written and spoken language; thus, discourse explores who uses the language, to whom, why, when, where and how. (Sifianou, 2001:1-9)
                            

By ‘polysemy’ I mean:

a) ‘the phenomenon whereby a single vehicle has multiple related sense-units associated with it’ (Evans 2009: 149).

b) “the association of two or more related senses with a single linguistic form” (Taylor, 2003: 638).

c) not only a property of words but also a property of morphemes, morphosyntactic categories, and even syntactic constructions. (2003: 638).

 By ‘metonymy’ I mean the linguistic effect whereby a concept stands for something else; state of affairs/ situations/ events etc.

Both polysemy and metonymy are transformed into image schemas. An image schema is the combination of visualizing reality through the sensory system of seeing, hearing, feeling. However, it is more than the senses; it covers aspects of containing and verticality as well.

When we say that polysemy is a dynamic byproduct of this operation of conceptual integration, it is not a property of the words themselves. Polysemy is therefore ubiquitous but also barely noticeable in most cases.

When we speak of something in a metonymic manner we make our adaptation in virtue of a particular context. We coerce, modulate and select information so that to conceptualize the embedded message, either written, or spoken. As Cruse (2004: 118-20) claims Selection is observed when all the readings are suppressed except one. Then, this one reading will be “selected” and in this situation we cannot have more that one alternative. Coercion is expressed by the fact that we often try to convey an “intelligible message” through possible meaning extensions. In other words, if we find one meaning we consider it as the intended meaning so that to say that the context has “coerced a new meaning. Finally, modulation could be defined as a variation arising as a result of contextual effects which do not go beyond the bounds of a single sense. Hence, contextual modulation is divided into enrichment and impoverishment. Enrichment means to add information to the semantic context and make it more specific, whereas impoverishment could be viewed as the presence of “a lexical item [which] is being used in a vague sense”.

As humans we are predisposed to use language metonymic and denote meaning in a polysemic way. Both  polysemy and metonymy is dependent on higher pragmatic knowledge- knowledge of the world. In the later stages of acquisition the mind designates meaning in words by placing them into context. Theory of Mind is predisposed in humans and its processes such as contextualization are interrelated with encyclopedic knowledge and shared experience. 

"Sorry I'm not feeling myself today": The metaphor system in poetry

It has been observed that in persuasive language and by the term 'persuasive' encompassing genres such as politics, ads, literary texts and most of all poetry the metaphorical system is dominant.


In post-modern works; for instance in Oslon, Cage, Duncan, Bukowski, Owen, Palmer, Davidson, Bernstein, Pulmer, North, Trinidad and in many others the loss of self metaphor is juxtaposed and embedded. The self is regarded as the totality of facts and things. Facts refer to state of affairs, situations, experience and things to more objective entities such as the human body in itself (especially the female one). 


From a linguistic aspect- or to put it better from a more Cognitive view the metaphor lies on the embodiment condition. With respect to this, language shapes meaning and meaning shapes feelings and emotions. In virtue of emotive language the metaphor and especially the loss of self metaphor is used as the vehicle for expression. 


A person is presented as a dual entity.It is understood as a group of entities: the Subject & the Self. This distinction is applied on the basis of conceptualizing a holistic system of experiences (such as imagining ourselves as being someone else).—A person is the totality of Subject and Self. The experiencing consciousness is the Subject. The bodily and functional aspects constitute the Self due to a spatial relationship between Subject & Self. Hence,the metaphor is a way of conceptualizing a wide range of real experiences both positive & negative. The conceptualization of conscious control in terms of Self & Subject presupposes that the Subject possesses and controls the Self. If control is lost, possession is also lost.

Do we always speak of what we mean? Evidence from Reference

Do we always speak of what we mean? Do we always use reference in order to denote meaning and how can we really define its counterparts? Language can be ‘misleading’ in certain cases since not all referring expressions necessarily convey reference. Definite descriptions, deictics, generics, indexicals, proper names etc., should not be regarded as simple cases of referring expressions as their meaning goes beyond the utterance they occur. Their reference is shaped both by the intention of the speaker and the way the audience makes the identification with what is being referred. Non-referring is not restricted only to the attributive, or equative use of referring expressions. This paper will follow a more critical approach concerning (non)reference and examples will be drawn from newspaper articles, political speeches and advertisements; (non)reference will be considered as the interrelation of the situation derived from a particular context, on the basis of who, to whom, why, when, where and how norms of interaction, interpretation and genres are used.

References:

Bach, K. (1987): Thought and Reference. Oxford: Clarendon P.

Bloomaert, J. (2005): Discourse. New York: Cambridge UP.

Cruse, A. (2004): Meaning in Language, “Oxford Textbooks in Linguistics”. Series eds. Keith Brown,

Eve V. Clark, April Mc Mahon, Jim Miller & Lesley Milroy. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Donnellan, K. (1966): “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. Philosophical Review. 75: 281-304.

Eikmeyer, H. & Rieser, H. Ed. (1981): Meanings, Intentions and Stereotypes, “Words, Worlds and

Contexts.” Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter. 133-150.

Kitis, E. (2009-10): “Semantics”. Thessaloniki: Aristotle UP.

Kitis, E. (MS): Deixis. Thessaloniki: Aristotle UP.

Kripke, S. (1972): “Naming and Necessity”. In Semantics for natural language, eds. Donald Davidson

and Gilbert Harman. Dordrecht: Reidel. 253-355 and 763-9.

Lyons, C. (1999): Definiteness. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

The paper was presented in the 20th International Symposium of Theoretical and Applied Linguistics.

To my supervisors -professors for their guidance, my colleagues for the support  and most of all to despoina for her encouragement...

The Two Types of Modality: Agent-Oriented Vs. Epistemic Modality, A review on Heine's argument

Bernd Heine argues for the two types of modality, that is agent-oriented (also known as deontic root, objective, and pragmatic) and epistemic modality (also known as subjective, or hypothetical). Heine claims that epistemic modality is more subjective compared to agent-oriented modality, which is more objective; Thus, there are some modals, such as will,  that have closer relationship with the verb and some others, such as must, that do not have so close relationship with the verb of the sentence (19). As a result, will provokes agent-oriented modality (as it expresses objectivity), whereas must provokes epistemic modality (as it expresses subjectivity).

What factors affect modality?

The behavior of the modals in terms of agent-oriented and epistemic senses is affected by the type of the main verb of the clause; verbs expressing action and telic verbs provoke agent-oriented modality, but stative verbs provoke both types of modality (25). However, there are some other factors affecting modality, such as the type of proposition, tense, and aspect; in perfect, modals have agent oriented uses, and the same happens with interrogative and negative propositions (25).

Examples.

1. He had to come. (Agent-Oriented)
2. Does he need to come? (Agent-Oriented)
3. He must be coming. (Epistemic)
4. He must have come. (Epistemic)      

Contextual frames are associated with the two types of modality. “The notion of a contextual frame is similar to what others have called an ‘inferential schema,’ or simply a ‘frame,’ i.e. a body of knowledge evoked the language user in order to provide an inferential basis for the understanding of an utterance” (27-8). According to Heine, contextuality lies upon some factors such as contextual clues (focal frames which do not require mental effort or imagination, and non-focal frames which require objectivity), knowledge of the world (it provokes epistemic modality, as we can not change events or incidents) and social norms (for instance, when we believe in something socially acceptable, we can have either agent-oriented or epistemic sense, but when something is socially disapproved, only epistemic sense occurs) (28)

      Examples.

1. It must be three o’clock. (knowledge of the world, epistemic)
2. He has to be brave. (socially acceptable norm, agent-oriented)
3. He must be brave. (socially acceptable norm, epistemic)
4. He must be a coward. (socially unacceptable norm, epistemic)
5. He is said to beat his wife. (human agent as the subject, agent-oriented)    

Additionally, Heine argues for the issue of conceptual properties in relation to

the two kinds of modality. He takes into account the conceptual properties of force, controlling agent, dynamic event, time reference, and probability; all these factors provoke agent-oriented modality (29). Force, is provoked when a constituent is characterized by an “element of will” (Jespersen 1924: 320-1), that has an interest in an event either occurring or not (29). Dynamic events are observed when something manipulates a particular situation and provokes the change of a state (29).
       Examples

1. He has to come. (force)
2. I insist that he comes. (Controlling agent)

Heine’s “metaphor” and context model

In this part, I would like to mention that Heine, apart from the agent-oriented and epistemic modality, he also discusses the metaphor and context model. For instance, he takes the phrase be going to, and changes it from its concrete/ lexical meaning (the concrete meaning refers to the intention someone may have to go somewhere and  it indicates an action) to the grammatical meaning of the future tense (37). According to Heine, this transformation happens “from one domain of human conceptualization to another.” (37) In other words, he observes that the literal meaning of be going to (i.e. Sally is going to the town.) expresses some kind of motion in terms of space, and is a metaphor model; on the other hand the non-literal meaning of be going to (i.e. Sally is going to wake up in a minute.) is a context model as the literal meaning is ruled out.

       On the other hand, some linguists like Sweetser, suggest that “the conceptual shift from the agent-oriented to the epistemic domain is a clear instance of a metaphorical process.” (39) Coates, also observes that modal auxiliaries are transformed from agent-oriented to epistemic, due to the three types of intedeterminacy: gradience, ambiguity, and merger (39). However, Heine, Claudi and Hunnemeyer claim that both the metaphor and the context model are required for different levels; thus, the context model relates with the micro-level and the metaphor with the macro-level of the conceptual shift (40). Consequently, for be going to, the micro-level extension of the construction refers to its present uses and the cases of ambiguity between physical motion and intention; on the other hand, the macro-level is concerned with the shift from “a concrete source proposition to an abstract grammatical function.” (40-1)

In this part, I would like to point out that the theory concerning the discrimination between agent-oriented and epistemic Modality, is very useful for the theme of the research paper; which is the presence or absence of modality in conditionality, and especially in hypothesis. As we have mentioned before, modality is affected by many factors like the tense; for example according to Ritter epistemic modality is highly related with future tense and in its meaning it “entails that a temporal domain created by an FPS-form is a kind of intentional domain.” (136) Thus, we could easily agree with Declerck and Reed who claim that the future tense will cover not only the “pure future” sense but also “prediction” and “predictability.” (135)  As a result, epistemic modality exists in future tenses when something has its own set of presuppositions and truth conditions, and each of them can be evaluated and interpreted (136).

Examples with epistemic modalizers

1. If you asked him politely, he (may/ will) do it for you. (open-P)
2. If you had asked him politely, he (might/ would perhaps/ would certainly) had done it for you. (counterfactual)

Reference without Reference) Follow me in ISTAl for full discussion!!

Do we always speak of what we mean? How can we really define the counterparts of meaning? In a sentence like “Shakespeare is the author of Romeo and Juliet” the proper name Shakespeare is in predicate position as it identifies a quality or an activity of the entity and should not be simply regarded as an instance of direct reference. Language can be “misleading” in some cases, as not all referring expressions necessarily convey reference.

The Resolving of the Ambiguity

Structural Ambiguities

• Ambiguity deals with coherence and understanding. In our life when we say that something is ambiguous we mean that it is unclear, confusing, or not certain, especially because it can be understood in more than one way. 
• First of all, a more scientific or a more syntactic definition of the term ambiguity/ ambiguous is very enlightening. Haegeman observes that in case of having two groupings of words, suiting in a particular string of words, we deal with the cause of the ambiguity of the string or structural ambiguity, as we need structure and  syntax in order to comprehend the dual meaning of the constituent (9-10). Apart from this, according to Victoria Fromkin, Robert Rodman and Nina Hyams

[A]mbiguous sentences have more than one phrase structure tree, corresponding to a different meaning. The sentence 

• The boy saw the man with the telescope is ambiguous. 

One meaning of the sentence is “the boy used the telescope to see the man. The first phrase structure tree represents this meaning. The key element is the position of the PP directly under the VP. Although the PP is under VP, it is not a complement because it is not selected by the verb. The verb see selects an NP only. In this sentence, the PP has an adverbial function and modifies the verb. In its other meaning, “the boy saw a man who had a telescope,” the PP with the telescope occurs under the direct object NP, where it modifies the noun man. In its second meaning, the complement of the verb see is the entire NP-the man with the telescope. The PP in the first structure is generated by the rule:

VP→V  NP  PP

In the second structure the PP is generated by the rule:

NP→Det  N  PP

Two interpretations are possible because the rules of syntax permit different structures for the same linear order of words (143-4).

Another example could be the following: 150 black cab drivers. The particular NP is

ambiguous because it can be interpreted in three different ways.

1. 150[[black cab] drivers]
2. 150[black [cab drivers]]
3. 150 drivers of [black cabs]

Also, a tall rose grower can have the following double structure:

1. [[Adj.-Noun]-Noun] → a [[tall rose]grower]
2. [Adj.-[Noun-Noun]] → a [tall[rose grower]]

• Another major issue, related to structural ambiguity is Discontinuous Dependences. This means that we can have a sentence which does not seem to be ambiguous, but contains participles or phrasal verbs. The position of the participle within the sentence could be considered as a cause of ambiguity, as various interpretations are possible (Corpus 50-510). The following instances will help us understand this case better.

 1. Mary stood up her date.     Vs. Mary stood her date up. 

Also, the issue of discontinuous dependency is associated with modifiers.

2. Several people who were wearing hats came in Vs.

Several people came in who were wearing hats.

In this case the modifying clause provides information about the head noun (example 1) or the head noun indicates information for the clause, as in this case its position is in the end of the sentence. (example 2)

In addition to this, structural ambiguity is associated with Thematic Roles: “Some constituents of the sentence are inherently required by the meaning of the verb. It is as if each verb sets the scene for some kind of situation: the verb requires a number of entities that will be involved in the situation. The participants in the situation are called the arguments of the verb” (Haegeman 192). Also, Haegeman states that the Agent, the one intentionally initiates the action, is the subject, and the Theme, the entity undergoing a change of state, is the direct object. (192) Thus, after having the term, Thematic Roles, I will briefly explain its association with structural ambiguity through a very simple example: Sherlock saw the man using binoculars. The interpretations of the example are the following: a) Sherlock used the binoculars to see the man b) A man was using binoculars, and Sherlock saw him. Sherlock, denotes a particular person, man denotes a set-the set of man, the denotes a function that takes a set as its argument, saw denotes a function that takes a person/ thing as argument and yields a set and using binoculars denotes the set of people who were using this object. (Stephenson 3) Lastly, Stephenson argues that “constituent structure reflects semantic composition [the and man combine together first before combining with saw and also that] there are three ways that meanings are put together: a function applies to an argument, two sets are intersected, check weather something is a member of that set” (3).

• Furthermore, ambiguity could be also defined as Scope Ambiguity “a type of confusing ambiguity characterized by confusion over the role a word plays in the sentence. Example: Prostitutes appeal to Pope. There is some debate over whether Scope Ambiguity represents a unique type of ambiguity or whether it belongs to Syntactic Ambiguity or Lexical Semantic Ambiguity” <http: //everything2com>. Also, another definition concerning ambiguity is Grouping Ambiguity: “[…] a type of syntactic ambiguity that is ambiguous because it is unclear whether a modifier in a sentence modifies only one or several objects. Example: Hand on me the red and the yellow balls. (Hand me the red ball and the yellow ball, Hand me the balls that are red and yellow” <http: //everything2com>.
• Structural ambiguity has a strong impact on literature in terms of syntactic analysis; this means that while reading a book we may be unable to interpret author’s implement properly. We can transport this difficulty and attach it on the level of linguistics and particularly syntax. According to Kimball and Frazier the structure based ambiguity consists of two categories: “Right Association-a constituent tends to attach to another constituent immediately to its right [and] Minimal Attachment- a constituent tends to attach so as to involve the fewest additional syntactic nodes” (Hindle, Rooth 257).

Reference and Counterparts

 Introduction

There is a strong connection between meaning and reference, as they both share common similarities and illustrate the way language is used by its speakers. Reference is associated with context. According to Halliday (2008:8) the structure of a sentence is bound by “situational constraints: the field (purpose of interaction), the tenor (roles and relationships between interlocutors) and the mode (channel of interaction). Moreover, Hymes (cited in Sifianou 2001: 62-5, 73) claims that context is shaped by setting, participants, ends (i.e. purposes- outcomes- goals), act sequences, key, instrumentalities (channel, forms of speech), norms (norms of interaction, norms of interpretation) and genres (like poems, myths, news, broadcasts etc.). Finally, Eikmeyer and Rieser (1981: 147) assume that meaning is based both on context and linguistic background.

The Counterparts of Reference

Deixis

According to Huang, the term “deixis” is interrelated with the structure of a language and the context in which the language is used; it encodes universal features that serve for communication (2007:132). Furthermore, Huang (2007: 135) claims that “deixis” is organized in an “egocentric way” and the “deictic centre” or “the deictic origo” is called ground zero because it includes both the person who speaks and the time at which a specific utterance is produced and the place where that utterance is produced. Hence, deixis is divided in three main types: “person deixis”, “spatial deixis” and “temporal deixis”.

Social Deixis and Discourse Meaning

I shall not disregard the role of social deixis in meaning. For Huang (2007: 163) social deixis is “[t]he codification of the social status of the speaker, the addressee, or a third person or entity referred to, as well as the social relationships holding between them”. Social deixis could be further defined as “relational social deixis” and is composed of the following counterparts: a) speaker- referent, b) speaker-addressee, c) speaker- bystander and d) speaker- setting (2007:164-5).

Definite - Indefinite – Generic Reference

According to Cruse (2004: 320), reference is divided in three subcategories: definite, indefinite and generic. Firstly, definite reference considers the identification of the referents of definite expressions, so that the hearer will be able to reconstruct what has been uttered by the speaker. Secondly, indefinite reference “hinges” nothing on the identity of the referent; thirdly, generic reference is the general or overall reference to a class of referents, either something is predicated of the whole class referred to, or something is predicted by each member of the class (2004:320, 3).

Referring and Non- Referring, Constant and Variable Reference

Saeed (1997) distinguishes between referring and non-referring expressions, constant and variable reference. Nouns are referring expressions because they identify an entity; thus, sometimes they are used in order to distinguish between instances (1997:26). Reference is further differentiated from constant to variable; Constant reference is considered with expressions having the same referent across a range of different variables (i.e. the Eiffel Tower, the Pacific Ocean), whereas variable reference includes referent expressions, which are totally context-dependent (1997:26-7).

Speaker Reference

According to Bach (1987:7, 59-50) persons, places and things is what we encounter in perception because when we think and speak about the world around us, we form and express thoughts about them. Speaker reference occurs when we talk about something, without necessarily being referred to it; consequently, refer to something means to identify it verbally.

Reference, Creativity and Mental Models

Zelisky-Wibbelt (2001: 11) claims that mental models explain the way speakers represent meaningful utterances by integrating their referential information, so that they manage to have a coherent representation of the conceived situation. Propositional representations are created and more specialized ones about a particular situation. Consequently, mental models contribute to the “coherent integration of referential information in the representation which is analogous to the conceived situation” (2000:12).

Indexicality

Koutoupi- Kitis argues for the issue of indexicality by supporting that there are certain elements of speech, geographically or socially located, that are considered to be indexes which not only put the speaker in a particular situation, but also witness details concerning speaker’s identity (262). For Rast (2006) indexical reference carries information deriving from extra-linguistic features of the context of the utterance, the general world context and speaker’s inferences and beliefs.

Indexicals & A Priori Truths

A priori truths, as Cappelen (2002: 277) claims, are an essential feature of indexicals as their linguistic meaning can generate certain kinds of universal truths. Universal truths are generated as follows: the linguistic meaning of an expression is identified with its “character, which is a function that delivers the expression’s content at each context” (2002:278).

Definitiness

According to Lyons the notion of definiteness is also known as the familiarity hypothesis, because “the” means that the entity denoted by the NP is familiar to both speaker and hearer, whereas “a” does not signal any familiarity at all (1999:3). Definiteness also means to identify something, so it is associated with identifiability. In other words, the definite article directs the hearer of the referent of the NP by signaling that he is in a position to identify it. Additionally, the opposite notion of definiteness, indefiniteness is also associated with identifiability because “a” is neutral with respect to uniqueness. However, definiteness goes beyond the NP as it occurs rather widely. For instance, the tense-aspect distinction between past historic (i.e. I have read that book) and perfect (i.e. I read that book) could be considered as a further discrimination between definite and indefinite past. (Lyons 1999:5-6, 12, 33, 45-6)

Meaning in later and early Wittgenstein

• In TLP (1921) Wittgenstein focuses on the logic of language by introducing a picture theory of meaning and claiming that language is the totality of facts (Kitis, Strands in Pragmatics: 7, 10,13). 
• As Biletzki (2003:28) observes he defines meaning as reference and the meaning of a sentence as definite sense, whereas in PI (1974) he defines meaning as use. 
• In TLP (1921) he claims that a name (=object) has meaning when it has a reference point; a word is meaningful only in the proposition in which it occurs. 
•  Wittgenstein considers a fact as a particular state, or situation; thus, a state of affairs could be regarded as the combination of words, which are interrelated, with the meaning of all components of a specific state of affairs.
• On the other hand, in PI (1974) he establishes a functional outlook in language by regarding language as the “tool of human communication” and as a “form of life” (Kitis, Strands in Pragmatics: 6-7).

•  He now establishes the “use theory of meaning” by stating that the meaning of a word is its use and that a name is descriptive because it is the instrument for a particular use; therefore he assumes that a name can construct a picture of reality and proves his argument through “language games” and “family resemblances”. Before moving to these issues I shall also add that in PI he relates propositions with logic because he supposes that propositions deal with real words, which means that they depict the way we use language on daily basis. 

• Lastly, I view that in his later work he seems to oppose to TLP and “picture theory of meaning” as he claims that an image is an object rather than a picture; consequently, without language we cannot express meaning if we cannot influence others with our thoughts (PI: 1974. 16, 119, 137, 139).