- In TLP (1921) Wittgenstein focuses on the logic of language by introducing a picture theory of meaning and claiming that language is the totality of facts (Kitis, Strands in Pragmatics: 7, 10,13).
- As Biletzki (2003:28) observes he defines meaning as reference and the meaning of a sentence as definite sense, whereas in PI (1974) he defines meaning as use.
- In TLP (1921) he claims that a name (=object) has meaning when it has a reference point; a word is meaningful only in the proposition in which it occurs.
- Wittgenstein considers a fact as a particular state, or situation; thus, a state of affairs could be regarded as the combination of words, which are interrelated, with the meaning of all components of a specific state of affairs.
- On the other hand, in PI (1974) he establishes a functional outlook in language by regarding language as the “tool of human communication” and as a “form of life” (Kitis, Strands in Pragmatics: 6-7).
- He now establishes the “use theory of meaning” by stating that the meaning of a word is its use and that a name is descriptive because it is the instrument for a particular use; therefore he assumes that a name can construct a picture of reality and proves his argument through “language games” and “family resemblances”. Before moving to these issues I shall also add that in PI he relates propositions with logic because he supposes that propositions deal with real words, which means that they depict the way we use language on daily basis.
- Lastly, I view that in his later work he seems to oppose to TLP and “picture theory of meaning” as he claims that an image is an object rather than a picture; consequently, without language we cannot express meaning if we cannot influence others with our thoughts (PI: 1974. 16, 119, 137, 139).
