The Resolving of the Ambiguity

Structural Ambiguities

• Ambiguity deals with coherence and understanding. In our life when we say that something is ambiguous we mean that it is unclear, confusing, or not certain, especially because it can be understood in more than one way. 
• First of all, a more scientific or a more syntactic definition of the term ambiguity/ ambiguous is very enlightening. Haegeman observes that in case of having two groupings of words, suiting in a particular string of words, we deal with the cause of the ambiguity of the string or structural ambiguity, as we need structure and  syntax in order to comprehend the dual meaning of the constituent (9-10). Apart from this, according to Victoria Fromkin, Robert Rodman and Nina Hyams

[A]mbiguous sentences have more than one phrase structure tree, corresponding to a different meaning. The sentence 

• The boy saw the man with the telescope is ambiguous. 

One meaning of the sentence is “the boy used the telescope to see the man. The first phrase structure tree represents this meaning. The key element is the position of the PP directly under the VP. Although the PP is under VP, it is not a complement because it is not selected by the verb. The verb see selects an NP only. In this sentence, the PP has an adverbial function and modifies the verb. In its other meaning, “the boy saw a man who had a telescope,” the PP with the telescope occurs under the direct object NP, where it modifies the noun man. In its second meaning, the complement of the verb see is the entire NP-the man with the telescope. The PP in the first structure is generated by the rule:

VP→V  NP  PP

In the second structure the PP is generated by the rule:

NP→Det  N  PP

Two interpretations are possible because the rules of syntax permit different structures for the same linear order of words (143-4).

Another example could be the following: 150 black cab drivers. The particular NP is

ambiguous because it can be interpreted in three different ways.

1. 150[[black cab] drivers]
2. 150[black [cab drivers]]
3. 150 drivers of [black cabs]

Also, a tall rose grower can have the following double structure:

1. [[Adj.-Noun]-Noun] → a [[tall rose]grower]
2. [Adj.-[Noun-Noun]] → a [tall[rose grower]]

• Another major issue, related to structural ambiguity is Discontinuous Dependences. This means that we can have a sentence which does not seem to be ambiguous, but contains participles or phrasal verbs. The position of the participle within the sentence could be considered as a cause of ambiguity, as various interpretations are possible (Corpus 50-510). The following instances will help us understand this case better.

 1. Mary stood up her date.     Vs. Mary stood her date up. 

Also, the issue of discontinuous dependency is associated with modifiers.

2. Several people who were wearing hats came in Vs.

Several people came in who were wearing hats.

In this case the modifying clause provides information about the head noun (example 1) or the head noun indicates information for the clause, as in this case its position is in the end of the sentence. (example 2)

In addition to this, structural ambiguity is associated with Thematic Roles: “Some constituents of the sentence are inherently required by the meaning of the verb. It is as if each verb sets the scene for some kind of situation: the verb requires a number of entities that will be involved in the situation. The participants in the situation are called the arguments of the verb” (Haegeman 192). Also, Haegeman states that the Agent, the one intentionally initiates the action, is the subject, and the Theme, the entity undergoing a change of state, is the direct object. (192) Thus, after having the term, Thematic Roles, I will briefly explain its association with structural ambiguity through a very simple example: Sherlock saw the man using binoculars. The interpretations of the example are the following: a) Sherlock used the binoculars to see the man b) A man was using binoculars, and Sherlock saw him. Sherlock, denotes a particular person, man denotes a set-the set of man, the denotes a function that takes a set as its argument, saw denotes a function that takes a person/ thing as argument and yields a set and using binoculars denotes the set of people who were using this object. (Stephenson 3) Lastly, Stephenson argues that “constituent structure reflects semantic composition [the and man combine together first before combining with saw and also that] there are three ways that meanings are put together: a function applies to an argument, two sets are intersected, check weather something is a member of that set” (3).

• Furthermore, ambiguity could be also defined as Scope Ambiguity “a type of confusing ambiguity characterized by confusion over the role a word plays in the sentence. Example: Prostitutes appeal to Pope. There is some debate over whether Scope Ambiguity represents a unique type of ambiguity or whether it belongs to Syntactic Ambiguity or Lexical Semantic Ambiguity” <http: //everything2com>. Also, another definition concerning ambiguity is Grouping Ambiguity: “[…] a type of syntactic ambiguity that is ambiguous because it is unclear whether a modifier in a sentence modifies only one or several objects. Example: Hand on me the red and the yellow balls. (Hand me the red ball and the yellow ball, Hand me the balls that are red and yellow” <http: //everything2com>.
• Structural ambiguity has a strong impact on literature in terms of syntactic analysis; this means that while reading a book we may be unable to interpret author’s implement properly. We can transport this difficulty and attach it on the level of linguistics and particularly syntax. According to Kimball and Frazier the structure based ambiguity consists of two categories: “Right Association-a constituent tends to attach to another constituent immediately to its right [and] Minimal Attachment- a constituent tends to attach so as to involve the fewest additional syntactic nodes” (Hindle, Rooth 257).

Reference and Counterparts

 Introduction

There is a strong connection between meaning and reference, as they both share common similarities and illustrate the way language is used by its speakers. Reference is associated with context. According to Halliday (2008:8) the structure of a sentence is bound by “situational constraints: the field (purpose of interaction), the tenor (roles and relationships between interlocutors) and the mode (channel of interaction). Moreover, Hymes (cited in Sifianou 2001: 62-5, 73) claims that context is shaped by setting, participants, ends (i.e. purposes- outcomes- goals), act sequences, key, instrumentalities (channel, forms of speech), norms (norms of interaction, norms of interpretation) and genres (like poems, myths, news, broadcasts etc.). Finally, Eikmeyer and Rieser (1981: 147) assume that meaning is based both on context and linguistic background.

The Counterparts of Reference

Deixis

According to Huang, the term “deixis” is interrelated with the structure of a language and the context in which the language is used; it encodes universal features that serve for communication (2007:132). Furthermore, Huang (2007: 135) claims that “deixis” is organized in an “egocentric way” and the “deictic centre” or “the deictic origo” is called ground zero because it includes both the person who speaks and the time at which a specific utterance is produced and the place where that utterance is produced. Hence, deixis is divided in three main types: “person deixis”, “spatial deixis” and “temporal deixis”.

Social Deixis and Discourse Meaning

I shall not disregard the role of social deixis in meaning. For Huang (2007: 163) social deixis is “[t]he codification of the social status of the speaker, the addressee, or a third person or entity referred to, as well as the social relationships holding between them”. Social deixis could be further defined as “relational social deixis” and is composed of the following counterparts: a) speaker- referent, b) speaker-addressee, c) speaker- bystander and d) speaker- setting (2007:164-5).

Definite - Indefinite – Generic Reference

According to Cruse (2004: 320), reference is divided in three subcategories: definite, indefinite and generic. Firstly, definite reference considers the identification of the referents of definite expressions, so that the hearer will be able to reconstruct what has been uttered by the speaker. Secondly, indefinite reference “hinges” nothing on the identity of the referent; thirdly, generic reference is the general or overall reference to a class of referents, either something is predicated of the whole class referred to, or something is predicted by each member of the class (2004:320, 3).

Referring and Non- Referring, Constant and Variable Reference

Saeed (1997) distinguishes between referring and non-referring expressions, constant and variable reference. Nouns are referring expressions because they identify an entity; thus, sometimes they are used in order to distinguish between instances (1997:26). Reference is further differentiated from constant to variable; Constant reference is considered with expressions having the same referent across a range of different variables (i.e. the Eiffel Tower, the Pacific Ocean), whereas variable reference includes referent expressions, which are totally context-dependent (1997:26-7).

Speaker Reference

According to Bach (1987:7, 59-50) persons, places and things is what we encounter in perception because when we think and speak about the world around us, we form and express thoughts about them. Speaker reference occurs when we talk about something, without necessarily being referred to it; consequently, refer to something means to identify it verbally.

Reference, Creativity and Mental Models

Zelisky-Wibbelt (2001: 11) claims that mental models explain the way speakers represent meaningful utterances by integrating their referential information, so that they manage to have a coherent representation of the conceived situation. Propositional representations are created and more specialized ones about a particular situation. Consequently, mental models contribute to the “coherent integration of referential information in the representation which is analogous to the conceived situation” (2000:12).

Indexicality

Koutoupi- Kitis argues for the issue of indexicality by supporting that there are certain elements of speech, geographically or socially located, that are considered to be indexes which not only put the speaker in a particular situation, but also witness details concerning speaker’s identity (262). For Rast (2006) indexical reference carries information deriving from extra-linguistic features of the context of the utterance, the general world context and speaker’s inferences and beliefs.

Indexicals & A Priori Truths

A priori truths, as Cappelen (2002: 277) claims, are an essential feature of indexicals as their linguistic meaning can generate certain kinds of universal truths. Universal truths are generated as follows: the linguistic meaning of an expression is identified with its “character, which is a function that delivers the expression’s content at each context” (2002:278).

Definitiness

According to Lyons the notion of definiteness is also known as the familiarity hypothesis, because “the” means that the entity denoted by the NP is familiar to both speaker and hearer, whereas “a” does not signal any familiarity at all (1999:3). Definiteness also means to identify something, so it is associated with identifiability. In other words, the definite article directs the hearer of the referent of the NP by signaling that he is in a position to identify it. Additionally, the opposite notion of definiteness, indefiniteness is also associated with identifiability because “a” is neutral with respect to uniqueness. However, definiteness goes beyond the NP as it occurs rather widely. For instance, the tense-aspect distinction between past historic (i.e. I have read that book) and perfect (i.e. I read that book) could be considered as a further discrimination between definite and indefinite past. (Lyons 1999:5-6, 12, 33, 45-6)

Meaning in later and early Wittgenstein

• In TLP (1921) Wittgenstein focuses on the logic of language by introducing a picture theory of meaning and claiming that language is the totality of facts (Kitis, Strands in Pragmatics: 7, 10,13). 
• As Biletzki (2003:28) observes he defines meaning as reference and the meaning of a sentence as definite sense, whereas in PI (1974) he defines meaning as use. 
• In TLP (1921) he claims that a name (=object) has meaning when it has a reference point; a word is meaningful only in the proposition in which it occurs. 
•  Wittgenstein considers a fact as a particular state, or situation; thus, a state of affairs could be regarded as the combination of words, which are interrelated, with the meaning of all components of a specific state of affairs.
• On the other hand, in PI (1974) he establishes a functional outlook in language by regarding language as the “tool of human communication” and as a “form of life” (Kitis, Strands in Pragmatics: 6-7).

•  He now establishes the “use theory of meaning” by stating that the meaning of a word is its use and that a name is descriptive because it is the instrument for a particular use; therefore he assumes that a name can construct a picture of reality and proves his argument through “language games” and “family resemblances”. Before moving to these issues I shall also add that in PI he relates propositions with logic because he supposes that propositions deal with real words, which means that they depict the way we use language on daily basis. 

• Lastly, I view that in his later work he seems to oppose to TLP and “picture theory of meaning” as he claims that an image is an object rather than a picture; consequently, without language we cannot express meaning if we cannot influence others with our thoughts (PI: 1974. 16, 119, 137, 139).

What is Wittgensteinian "Picture Theory of Meaning"?

Introduction

Ludwig Wittgenstein was one of the most enlightening forerunners for “logical positivism” and “ordinary language philosophy”. In this paper we will examine some of his main arguments as illustrated in Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus (1921) concerning meaning and language’s contribution in shaping meaning. Lastly, as reading the Tractatus, it is quite clear that he was highly influenced by Frege and Russel as far as meaning and language are concerned.

1.1  à Language is the most representational system of reality. We picture reality with facts and facts stand for units (= objects). The objects are the words we use in order to describe reality.

2.01 & 2.011 & 2.012à A fact represents a particular state or situation. Each situation is composed of words and each single word has its own meaning and it is further interrelated with the meaning of the other words in order to describe a complete state of affairs. However, an object (=word) cannot have meaning outside a proposition because its meaning is dependent to the meaning of the proposition in which it occurs.

2.0231à Structure reflects meaning through the form and the content. This means that a proposition pictures reality because meaning shapes language; therefore meaning must be represented in a structured proposition.

2.222à Sense stands for meaning and meaning is associated with reality (=truth); however meaning is not always associated with reality (=falsity).

3.203 & 3.3à A name is like a point and it has a meaning. In order to use language we must be able in advance to tell whether something has sense or nonsense. To put it more simply we can understand if a proposition has sense or nonsense by recognizing its internal properties (the property of each constituent).

4.431& 4.46à The truth conditions of a proposition refer to its possibility to express something true or false. This means that truth conditions should not be tested as Frege has analyzed them, but in an alternative way. They can be either tautological (true possibilities= truth) or contradictive (false possibilities= truth rather than falsity).

6.2322à If we consider that two expressions are identical we cannot that easily suppose that they also share the same meaning. They can have the same meaning (=identical) only if they have the same reference. Thus, meaning reference and identity are all interrelated.

Implications

In conclusion, all the above aphorisms conclude to Wittgenstein’s main claim that “what can be said can be said clearly” and “what we cannot talk must pass in silence”. As far as I can comprehend his claim I could assume that if we try to produce a pictorial representation of reality (and if we also consider that language, logic and reality are interrelated) we can speak of what we have in mind when this particular thing corresponds to a particular situation, state, object, name, point, sign of reality.