The Metonymicity of Grammar

Cognitive Linguistics Upon (De)Compositionality and Fixedness: A Critical Overview

Nunberg, Sag and Wasow (1994: 498) departed from the earlier understanding of compositionality as a binary phenomenon, which defined constructions either as idioms or as non-idioms; in contrast, they defined compositionality as “the degree to which the phrasal meaning, once known, can be analyzed in terms of the contributions of the idiom parts”. Various studies have provided empirical support in favor of this “compositional view” of language. 

To name just a few, Cacciari and Tabossi (1988), Glucksberg (1993), Peterson and Burgess (1993), and Titone and Connine (1994) observed that even in highly non-compositional constructions, the semantics of the component words are activated at least to some degree. Specifically, this observation suggests that the literal meanings of words facilitate the comprehension of idioms to the extent that they semantically overlap with the idiomatic meaning (Gibbs and Nayak 1989; Gibbs, Nayak, Bolton & Keppel 1989).

According to Baldwin (2004: 1) multiword expressions (MWEs) (including English phrasal verbs) are “idiosyncratic interpretations that cross word boundaries”. MWEs are sensitive to morphological and syntactic flexibility, which enable the language user to conceive their meaning (ibid: 1). Baldwin (2004: 7) further proposes that multiword expressions, whose degree of idiomaticity ranges from the literal to the idiomatic axis, can be interpreted by virtue of “decompositionality”, termed as “the degree to which the semantics of an MWE can be ascribed to those of its parts”.

At this point, I should mention that both traditional and Cognitive approaches to idiomatic expressions consider fixedness as an important factor studying multiword expressions like phrasal verbs. To be more precise, “fixed expression” is a very general but convenient term, adopted from Alexander (1978, 1979), Carter (1987) and others, and used to cover several kinds of a phrasal lexeme, a phraseological unit, or a multi-word lexical item. As Moon (2003: 2) observes these units include: i) frozen collocations, ii) grammatically ill-formed collocations, iii) proverbs, iv) routine formulae, v) sayings and, vi) similies. 

Moreover, other scholars assumed that fixed-form expressions, whether literal or figurative in interpretation, are simply lexical entries precisely like those assumed for standard literal interpretation of individual words (Swinney & Cutler 1979; Di Sciullo & Williams 1987). Finally, in its simplest description, a fixed figurative expression is a string of words for which the interpretation is not (entirely) derived from the individual meanings of the words comprising the string (even if there can be seen some historical linkage of the literal words to the overall expression); this non-literal interpretation has become “fixed” in the language by use (Hillert & Swinney 1999: 2).

The latter remark suggests that an idiom compound's meaning may be: a) entirely independent from the “literal” meanings of the individual words in the compound, b) partially related to one of the “literal” meanings of the compound via either structural or semantic analysis, or c) entirely ambiguous, having both a “literal” and a “figurative” meaning (Hillert & Swinney 1999: 3). For example, the English compound “redhead” is composed of: i) the structurally decomposable literal meaning involving a head that is red in color (perhaps from sunburn or dye), ii) the partially decomposable meaning of “having hair that is red”, and iii) the non-decomposable figurative meaning of “hot tempered”, a meaning derivable only by knowledge of personality features stereotypically associated with persons who have red-hair (ibid: 3). The latter meaning has come to be fixed by use, and is thus idiomatic. In similar manner, if we consider the case of the English compound “horse-laugh”, we will observe that with the exception of the small class of individuals who deal closely with horses (and who might attribute the human descriptor of laughter to a horse), there is no literal (decomposable or otherwise) interpretation of this compound; Yet the fixed idiom is easily understood to mean a loud annoying (braying) laugh by a human (ibid: 3).

Furthermore, according to Wray (2002) phrasal verbs once conventionalized belong to the class of fixed expressions. Fixed expressions refer to “specific combinations of two or more words that are typically used to express a specific concept. […] The defining feature of a FE is that it is a word combination, stored in the Mental Lexicon of native speakers that as a whole refers to a [linguistic] concept. This makes FEs non-compositional in the sense that the combination and structure of their elements need not be computed afresh, but can be retrieved from the Mental Lexicon. However, the degree of lexical and syntactic fixedness can vary” (Sprenger 2003: 4).

In this regard, the notion “fixed expression” encompasses more than idioms. As Booij (2009: 221) points out idiomatic expressions have one or more non-compositional properties, whereas a fixed expression may be completely compositional, but nevertheless stored because it is a conventional name for a particular concept. This view argues that linguistic knowledge encompasses both knowledge of the grammatical system of a language, and knowledge of the conventions involved in using that language (ibid: 221).

Moreover, Gibbs (1995: 99) claims that the most important problem concerning the analyzability of idioms derives from the traditional view according to which idioms are non-compositional and hence, their meaning cannot be predictable from an analysis of the meanings of their parts.  Gibbs (1995: 103) attempted to approach idiomaticity by relating it to fixedness; in particular, he claims that it is of utmost importance to consider that most languages have many idioms with similar figurative meanings. For instance, American English has many idioms referring to the concept of getting angry, such as “blow your stack”, “hit the ceiling”, “blow off steam”, “bite your head off”, “get pissed off” (ibid: 103).

Gibbs (1995: 104) further criticizes traditional approaches to idiomaticity stating that there is no particular reason why we should create and use so many different expressions to convey roughly the same idea or concept. He also disagrees with the view that each phrase’s meaning is supposedly determined by separate historical situations that have evolved into pragmatic conventions of use, implying that the link between an idiom and its figurative meaning is arbitrary and cannot be predicted from the meanings of its individual words (ibid: 104).

Contrary to the traditional view, Gibbs criticizes traditional approaches by pointing out that the figurative meanings of idioms might well be motivated by people’s conceptual knowledge that is itself constituted by metaphor (ibid: 104). For instance, the idiom “John spilled the beans” maps our knowledge of someone tipping over a container of beans to that of a person revealing some previously hidden secret; English speakers understand “spill the beans” to mean “reveal the secret” because there are underlying conceptual metaphors, such as THE MIND IS A CONTAINER and IDEAS ARE PHYSICAL ENTITIES, that structure their conceptions of minds, secrets, and disclosure (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). Even though the existence of conceptual metaphors does not predict that certain idioms or conventional expressions must appear in the language (i.e. “spill the beans” vs. “spill the peas”), the presence of these independent conceptual metaphors by which we make sense of experience partially explains why specific phrases, like “spill the beans” are used to refer to particular events (such as the revealing of secrets) (Gibbs 1995: 104).

Models of Studying English Phrasal Verbs

Traditional (formal) approaches

A) Bolinger (1971)

Intransitive verbs show just as clearly for the adverb, or the particle to attach itself semantically to the noun; for instance, he stands out or he stood apart. English phrasal verbs are defined by virtue of the syntactic properties of the particle; in particular, he claims that particles (such as off and on) form the most typical phrasal verbs and these particles function as adverbs or prepositions (ibid: 76). Particles, which oscillate between preposition and adverb, give rise to the so-called prepositional adverbs (ibid: 26). For instance, with prepositional adverbs a sentence like he run away or I walked home is grammatical compared to a sentence like *he run away school, or * I walked home my apartment.

B) Fraser (1976)

 Strong relationships between the verb and the particle show that a verb and a particle may combine in more than one way. For example, in some verb-particle combinations a constituent alteration of meaning results from the presence of the particle and this instance is referred as a type of “systematic combination”[1] (ibid: 5). Within the class of systematic verb-particle combinations there are two types:

1.   Those for which the co-occurrence restrictions on the verb and the particle are exactly the same for those which are not identical, such as drink down wherein the verb-particle combination is used transitively, but the verb alone cannot (ibid: 6).

2.    Combinations like deed over and hand out while instances of systematic verb-particle combinations do not share the same co-occurrence restrictions as the corresponding verbs. For instance:

i) The old man deeded over the estate.

ii)             * The old man deeded the estate.

iii)            Will you please hand out the secret folders?

iv)            * Will you please hand the secret folders? (Ibid: 6)

Cognitive Studies

A) Lindstromberg (1998)

According to this approach, the term phrasal verb or “multi-word verb” refers to verb plus preposition combinations, which are non-literal and more or less idiomatic (ibid: 22). Thus, pick up cannot be regarded as a phrasal verb because both “pick” and “up” have their common literal meanings. Lindstromberg’s (1998: 9) approach to English phrasal verbs places central emphasis on the semantics of prepositions (rather than their syntactic properties as introduced by Bolinger’s (1971) approach), since the preposition enables the language user to locate the subject in relation to the Landmark. In this regard, in, from, toward, by and between are prepositions of path because the Landmark is seen either as a container, or as a surface, or as long and narrow or even as a point on a potential or actual path:

a.          The Landmark as a container:

- In/ out of the room à location

- In/ out/ through the roomà movement along a path

- Throughout/ all through the roomà distribution

b. The Landmark as a surface:

- It’s lying on/ off/ across the carpetà location

- It went onto/ off/ across the carpetà movement along a path

- It scattered papers all across the carpetà distribution

c. The Landmark is seen as long and narrow:

- There’s a ditch along the roadà location

- Go along the roadà movement along a path

- They scattered litter all along the roadà distribution

d. The Landmark is seen as a point on a potential or actual path:

- It’s toward/ at/ away from the schoolà location

- We went to/ from/ via the schoolà movement along a path   (ibid: 13)

The aforementioned examples indicate that Lindstromberg’s (1998) approach to English phrasal verbs is merely based on the properties of the particles. Under this assumption, English phrasal verbs, which occur as the combination of the verb with extremely common particles (like those of the previous examples), can be further treated as perfective[3] phrasal verbs (Lindstromberg 1998: 23).

Moreover, Lindstromberg (1998) argues for the semantic classifications of phrasal verbs by virtue of three criteria: idiomaticity, number of elements and kind of metaphor. First of all, idiomaticity classifies phrasal verbs into non-idiomatic (put up your hand), semi-idiomatic (knock someone out) and idiomatic (put up with someone) (ibid: 244). The second criterion of classification refers to the number of metaphorically used elements. In particular, a zero element implies that in an utterance like cut up the onions, only the particle up is used non-literally; on the other hand, in an utterance like his remark cut her up, the verb cut in combination with the particle up is used non-literally (ibid: 244). In this case, the semantic interaction between “his remark” and the phrasal verb contributes to the metaphorization of the whole sentence (IDEAS/ ARGUMENTS are WAR).

The last criterion of Lindstromberg’s (1998) semantic classification deals with the so-called “kind of metaphor”. In other words, phrasal verbs are further categorized into two types: a) those deriving from a stereotypical image of an event, an activity or, a sequence of events, such as bump someone off  [=kill someone] and, b) those whose prepositions or particles express an abstract conventional metaphor, such as she turned him down (ibid: 245-246).

2) Rudzka-Ostyn's (2003) model

English phrasal verbs are a special type of expressions, wherein the particle or the preposition is attached to the verb. In particular, Rudzka-Ostyn (2003: 3) claims that if the meaning of the verb is known and if the meaning of the particle is spatial, the phrasal verb is generally easy to understand. In this regard, Rudza-Ostyn’s model of studying English phrasal verbs indicates that the spatial, prototypical meaning of the most frequent prepositions or particles is illustrated as across, along, away, back, by, down, in, inside, into, off, on, over, through, under and up (ibid: 3-4).

However, Rudza-Ostyn (2003) points out that there are two basic restrictions regarding the formation of English phrasal verbs. More precisely, the first restriction derives from the place of the particle according to which the more figurative a phrasal verb is, the more it forms a tight unit, and the less figurative a phrasal verb is, the verb and the particle can be split (ibid: 1). The second restriction deals with the passivization of phrasal verbs since only when there is a flow of energy from an agent to an object, phrasal verbs can be used in the passive (ibid: 1).

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[1] The boy bolted his food. à The boy bolted down his food.

   Drink your milk. à Drink down your milk. (Adapted from Fraser 1976: 5)

[2] The phonological shape of the verb indicates that the majority of verbs occurring with particles are monosyllabic, namely [l], [r], [m], or [n], i.e., live, run, make, nestle (Kennedy 1920; Whorf 1964; Fraser 1965).

[3] The term perfective mcomes from the Latin “per”, which means “through” and “-fect” comes from the Latin word “done” or “made”; hence, “perfect” means “done through”, or that something is done or complete (Lindstromberg 1998: 23-24).

C). My study (Tsaroucha 2012; MA dissertation, AUTH) 

i) Phrasal verbs can be studied on the grounds of idiomaticity i) idiomatic expressions are located on a cline of more or less fixedness, in the sense that they extend from literal to more metaphorical meanings and, ii) the idiomatic nature of English phrasal verbs is rooted in (de)compositionality.

ii) The verb-particle combination is subject to a certain kind of blend, wherein the semantics of the particle combine with the semantics of the verb, even if the particle and the verb do not have similar meanings. For instance, if we consider a sentence like let’s take up each problem one at a time, we will observe that the prototypical meaning of the verb take combines with the prototypical meaning of the particle up in such a way that the language user is in a position to interpret the phrasal verb as “to deal with”, rather than as “to raise” or “to begin”. 

iii) A Cognitive continuum of idiomaticity suggests that English phrasal verbs extend from metonymic to more metaphoric readings. On the basis of Gibbs’s (1995: 104) argument, stating that “the figurative meanings of [idiomatic expressions] might well be motivated by people’s conceptual knowledge that is itself constituted by metaphor”, I claim that people’s conceptual knowledge is firstly constituted by metonymy and then extends into metaphor.

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The Cognitive Grounding of English Phrasal Verbs [MA thesis Preface]

This study investigates the cognitive grounding of English phrasal verbs on the basis of two fundamental cognitive processes; metonymy and metaphor. Formal approaches to English phrasal verbs focus on syntactic and morphological factors, however, through this thesis I will attempt to study this type of idiomatic expressions on the basis of the cognitive framework since I believe it profoundly explains how speakers convey meaning with the use of English phrasal verbs. I will place central emphasis on metonymy, metaphor and image schemas. More precisely, the introductory part reviews former approaches to English phrasal verbs, which however, account merely on morpho-syntactic factors. The approach followed adopts the theoretical framework of Cognitive Linguistics, and particularly cognitive semantics, which places central emphasis on meaning, on the role of cognition and on the conceptualization and expression of linguistic expressions. It is argued that the semantics of the particle blend with the semantics of the verb in such a way so that the idiomatic character of the particular expression arises. It is further proposed that English phrasal verbs could be studied as the in-between point of (de)compositionality and fixedness. With regard to idiomaticity, it is claimed that there is a continuum from metonymic to metaphoric interpretations of English phrasal verbs, or cases of strong interaction between the two processes. The final part of the thesis attempts to propose that English phrasal verbs are rooted in image schemas. 

Acknowledgements
It is a pleasure to thank those who made this paper possible. I am heartily thankful to my supervisor, Professor Angeliki Athanasiadou, whose encouragement, supervision and support from the preliminary to the concluding level enabled me to develop an understanding of the subject. She never accepted less than my best efforts. 

The Syntax-Semantics Interface of English Phrasal Verbs; A View from Cognitive Grammar (To appear: Interfaces in English Linguistics 2012 Conference, Budapest October '12)

This paper investigates the syntax-semantics interface of English phrasal verbs as the in-between point of (de)compositionality and fixedness, and opposes to traditional approaches emphasizing merely morpho-syntactic factors (i.e., flexibility and voice). The theoretical framework adopted is Langacker’s (1987, 1990, 1991, 1999, 2009) Cognitive grammar, whose most central tenet states that grammar forms a continuum with the lexicon and is not autonomous “vis-à-vis semantics” but rather incorporates it.

In particular, it will be argued that the idiomatic meaning of English phrasal verbs is rooted both in syntactic (i.e., exceptional extraction from the NP) and in semantic (i.e., attribution effects) factors (Bolinger 1972; Kuno 1987; Deane 1991, 1992). More specifically, exceptional extraction constitutes the most representative factor accounting for the syntax-semantics interface of phrasal verbs. In NPs allowing extraction, the head noun describes an attribute, characteristic, or part of the extracted NP (Kuno 1987). Exceptional extraction is strongly related to length (Deane 1991), since it can be licensed when the head noun denotes an attribute and the extracted NP denotes what Langacker (1987) terms as the “cognitive domain” against which the attribute is defined.

Moreover, semantic factors will be analyzed on the basis of Geeraerts’s (1995) remarks on paradigmatic and semantic dimensions of idiomatic expressions. More precisely, the idiomatic meaning of English phrasal verbs derives from attribution effects, which are subject to the blend of the semantics of the particle with this of the verb. This kind of blend is employed in two steps: firstly, the syntagmatic dimension suggests that the verb and the particle are combined as separate linguistic entities, and secondly, the paradigmatic dimension indicates that the derived construction, which carries an idiomatic interpretation arises as the outcome of the blend.

Keywords:

Cognitive grammar, English phrasal verbs, idiomaticity, (de)compositionality, fixedness, syntagmatic, paradigmatic, blend. 

Cognitive Stylistics of News Media: The Case of Political Scandals and Its Impact on European Communities (Joint presentation with M. Siskou, To be presented in 5th ESHS, Athens, November 2012)

This paper investigates the mechanism of stylistics in European newspaper articles, headlines and magazines by focusing on instances of public scandals with regard to economy, law and politics. We will analyze the way in which the cognitive processes of metaphor and metonymy constitute the vehicle of persuasion by shaping public opinion and highlighting specific events. In particular, we will attempt to support the view that metaphor and metonymy -when used in news- serve not only as the media of communication but also affect public thought and simultaneously construct ideology. These cognitive processes act as the facilitators of conceptualization and comprehension of news events since they appeal immediately to the readership’s mental apparatus, irrespective of national, cultural and social characteristics, and educational background.

Furthermore, a cognitive analysis of media language may imply that metaphor and metonymy mediate the gist of the current scandal by communicating its message to the target readership. More precisely, we will try to propose that such kind of mediation occurs when these two cognitive processes are used in order to render a public scandal accessible to a wider audience. Hence, we shall claim that their ubiquitous character narrows down the conceptual distance of the sheer event by facilitating its conceptualization, internalization and comprehension by the reader.

For instance, in the case of “the Stonehouse Scandal” the metonymy “cash for honours” (The Daily Telegraph, March 2010) triggers the issues of morality and ethics by parallelizing and further identifying “honours” to “cash”. The metonymy degrades the positive connotations of the notion “honours”, which happens to be culturally entrenched to the British value system, by reflecting negative connotations through its association and identification with “cash” and further urges the reader to consider the possibility of equating something moral to something material and maybe of a less ethical value. Consequently, the mechanism of stylistics on the basis of metaphor and metonymy infiltrates the public scandal by orienting audience’s attention to specific linguistic elements, which are thematically related with the issues of politics, law and economy and shape ideology.

English Phrasal Verbs: A Case of Metonymy (To be presented in 19th International Congress of Linguistics, Geneva July 2013)

This paper studies English phrasal verbs on the basis of their spatial and temporal aspects that lead to their conceptualization and expression, and argues that this is a case of metonymy. Metonymy, as a fundamental cognitive process, is not only embedded, but also entrenched in the way humans orient and locate themselves and their actions in the world by grounding them in space and time. In this sense, the referential function of metonymy, which is embodied in our mental apparatus by encompassing universal and individual experiences, serves as the mediating point of encoding, decoding, internalizing, designating, shaping, expressing and producing phrasal verbs.

In particular, I will attempt to propose that the metonymic nature of English phrasal verbs could be analyzed by virtue of spatio-temporal aspects, which are reflected on the verb and its particles. Either the verb or the particle, or even both may be of equal dominance. Such a multidimensionality -with regard to space and time- allows speakers to construct mental relations concerning the actors interacting in an event, their activity, instruments, tools and affected objects or products. For instance, if we consider a sentence like they were in the area last night so they dropped in, but we were not home, we can understand that the phrasal verb drop in, stands for the action of making a visit to someone, without making any special arrangements.

I further support that in the case of phrasal verbs, the verb-particle combination entails the existence of a source (the location of the particular event: home), a path (the process of making the action of dropping in, grounded in space and time: in the area, last night) and a vehicle (the actors interacting in the event: they, we).  In this respect, the syntactic form of phrasal verbs (verb-particle construction) is governed by their semantic content, which is based on a certain kind of metonymic mapping that occurs within a single domain and shifts reference from the primary domain, which is secondary in the literal meaning (Croft 2002). Thus, when the particle is attached to the verb, an idiomatic expression arises: particles’ metonymic properties shift and extend the normal and prototypical meaning of the verb into a more idiomatic sense.

Lastly, the paper will investigate the metonymic readings of phrasal verbs on the ground of image-schemas representations, which may be explained from the particles’ metonymic properties. I will try to support the view that phrasal verbs reflect image schemas. In particular, I regard the verb-particle combinations as governing image schemas such as container (fill in, move in, take in, stand out, find out), part-whole relationship (break up, use up, come down with), linkage (get together, meet with), separation (break down, come apart), front-back orientation (call back, drop back, pay someone back), proximity and distance (prevail upon, shy away from, get rid of) and up-down orientation (go up, slow down, let down, keep down).

The Multidisciplinary Nature of Media Discourse

Media language needs the combination of more than one discipline for its complete examination and understanding. The operational function of advertisements triggers common sense knowledge by accounting on multiple dimensions of discourse such as philosophical, linguistic, psychological, sociological and anthropological. Knowledge of media language presupposes the grounding of the former notions into our perceptual apparatus; knowledge is expressed conveyed, accepted and shared in the discourse of advertising by further defining its nature as not only social, but also as cultural and subjective. Advertising is the body of multiple types of knowledge since its systematic analysis endows with not only the comprehension of a particular passage, but also with local and global knowledge a particular object signifies on the grounds of verbal and non-verbal processes of conceptualization. In other words, advertising entails a double association -in certain cases even a double dissociation- between meaning-interpretation and meaning-realization. 

Interpretability constraints of media discourse are based on the concept of a multidisciplinary matrix, which examines language from both an insider’s perspective (the surface structure of passages) and from an outsider’s perspective (meaningful remarks derived from visual, aural and auditory modalities. Commercials represent a synthesis of global behaviors with the individual’s experiences, resulting in an interactional discourse which further constitutes the reification of the given product as the image of the market on the one hand and the image a single consumer expects to obtain on the other. As long as the market remains relatively stable, fluctuating within predictable advertising techniques, the individual is disposed to operate according to the established attitudes (buy, or not a particular product). However, when the market produces such fluctuations that the individual is not able to locate with a single reading, old practices of advertising, are replaced by new ones, in our case subliminal images.

According to Danesi (2002: 179) advertising derives from the Medieval Latin verb “advertere”, which means to “direct one’s attention to”; it designates any type of public announcement and representation in order to promote the sale of specific commodities and services. According to Cook (1992: 3) advertisements are interactions of multiple elements such as language, paralanguage, participants, society, situations, pictures, music, other ads and discourses. The purpose of ads concerns the substances of attention getting, talking microchips, novel substance and lastly fixing the product more firmly by actively involving the reader (1999: 25). Lastly, it is should be noted that the difference between advertising and any other kinds of representations and activities lies on the fact that it aims at influencing judgments, attitudes and behaviors.

Advertisements need multidimensional readings in order to perceive their intended messages, if not entirely, at least approximately. The analysis of the particular genre demands two axes of organization: i) analyzing by virtue of synthesizing multiple disciplines and ii) embedding and de-embedding the multiple dimensions in the representational functions of commercials. The body of commercials entails the perception and the internalization of a stylistic structure, which functions as a mental path leading to the semantization and thematization of their persuasive nature. The structure of commercials is highly descriptive since it simply denotes a specific quality or quantity of the product, which has to be in proportion with consumers’ needs and desires. The dependency of advertisements on not only linguistic dimensions, but also on multiple discourses, leads in their enrichment and revitalized nature.

In particular, Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 258) argue for a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situations, institutions and social structures that frame it. They speak of discourse as a form of social practice, which embodies variables ranging from ideology and power, to hierarchy, gender and sociology. As for advertising, we could hypothesize that it is in parallel relations with the social aspects of human behavior so that to embody the linguistic information in the societal dimension that patterns the habitus.

But what is habitus and how can we define it in relation to modernity? And if habitus is associated with modernity, what is its impact on advertisements? Many scholars agree that the habitus is an aspect of human behavior on the grounds of ideology and socialization. As the following definitions show, habitus is an innate and universal aspect of human cognition. In particular, Bateson, Elias and Scollon claim that:

“The notion of the habit is a major economy of conscious thought” (Bateson [1942] 1972: 141).

“Social and physical habitus are interrelated and social and physical habitus are transformations of habitus resulted in historical change” (Elias 1939, 1968).

“Habitus is a set of generative dispositions and has its ontogenesis in the earliest development of social and cognitive life” (Scollon 2003: 176).

Therefore, habitus could be treated as a kind of embodied ideology as it constitutes a set of socially learnt dispositions, the acquisition of which is held through the activities and experiences of everyday life.

According to Scollon (2003:179) the modern world has reconstructed national habitus as the image of the society on the one hand and the image of the individual personality on the other. In other words, habitus could be defined as a mental structure functioning in the realization of social structure at the level of individual subjectivity. Social changes establish transformations by restructuring the habitus as old practices are replaced by new. As the world we live in constantly changes, the acts that we perform and our attitude towards them also has to change. On the grounds of the pattern of social transformations, we could further suppose that advertisements have to adjust their ideological and attitudinal character in proportion to the current social settings.  

In addition to the socio-cognitive definition on habitus, Myles (2010: 20) argues for its relation with mass media by proposing that the linguistic habitus acts as a constraint in media because the embodied nature of language is not only subject to the determinations of the market, but also to the type of “orchestrating” located in the habitus. To me, this assumption could be based on the fact that media has autonomy vis-à-vis the social field because it shapes or it is shaped from the transparency and immediacy of human experiences and ideologies. Media discourse embraces a sociological view of language that subordinates the non-arbitrariness of linguistic meaning in order to stress the necessity of persuading and promoting specific values and moralities.

Besides the above, the social dimension of advertising encodes two kinds of knowledge for discourse processing. Firstly, personal and group knowledge shapes mental models for the interpretation of the advertised message. After that, this knowledge becomes socially and culturally shared, if we consider the multiplicity of the channels of message transmission, like television, radio, magazines, newspapers, Internet, films etc. According to van Dijk (2003: 106) discourse processing correlates with social knowledge and demands a systematic analysis on the basis of four steps: i) comprehension of a passage through a huge amount of general knowledge, ii) local and global coherence, iii) presupposition of knowledge and iv) context model knowledge.

Moreover, media language is established in public space on the basis of generating power and further linking the concept of power with legitimacy and public discourse (Benhabib 1992: 80-1). Power is a fundamental concept of commercials, it is entrenched in the way the market presents products; however, power should not be solely described as a moral value originated by individualistic behaviors. I view that the concept of power is an abstraction of the processing language of commercials; power is not restricted to people, it is rather endowed with entities and objects. Habermasian philosophy explores the notion of public space in a dual manner: at a primary level the public sphere is approached as an institutional mechanism for rationalizing political and any other type (in our case advertising) domination and, at a secondary level the public sphere illustrates public opinion (Fraser 1992: 112-13).

With regard to advertising, I would like to stress that the notion of public sphere is governed by the derivative relationship between a logical object and a passive subject or, between a passive object and a logical object. According to me, commercials are inclusive devices of an object, which has to be entrenched in subjects’ choices; the given product stands for the object, which is either active –when it is represented by agents- or passive –when it is represented alone (for example, display commercials which singly illustrate products, without any particular setting). The subject stands for consumers’ public space; if the product is presented in a communicative environment surrounded from agents, consumers seem to passively and effortlessly process its message. However, if the product stands alone (for example, in certain display advertisements alcohol drinks are illustrated without any agents), the public sphere -consumers- need to process the intended message of commercials in a more active manner; they need to seek for the degree of desirability and necessity in buying the advertised object.

Lastly, Garnham (1992: 365, 367) claims that media communication synthesizes ideologies based upon face-to-face communication in a single physical space because, what has become mediated is the content of communication and the subject of debate. Could we further assume that what is physically shared, is lost? If we suppose that mass media focus on the necessary material resource base for any public sphere, we could further assert that markets tend to distribute advertisements on the basis of what a public sphere seeks to obtain. However, in a pluralistic perspective markets seek to influence subjects at a public point, which puts its grounds on individual constraints. As a result, the public space of advertising is mediated by a general social ideology reflected in an external reality that has to be subject to personal experiences and behaviors.  

Approaching the language of politics in a Cognitive manner

The title implies the non-literal use of language of politics and will focus on the metonymic use of /here/ and /there/ in speeches from the Hellenic Parliament; in other words I will argue on schematic transformations of the metonymic models of /edo/ and /eki/. The analysis will not be based on a discourse approach, rather on a cognitive one. 


Politics like all spheres of social activity, has its own code, a term used by linguists to refer to a language 
           variety of a particular group. The cognitive process that relates literal meanings to extended       
            meanings is known as mapping. Mapping is the projection of one set of conceptual entities 
            onto another set of conceptual shifts. We mentally trace a path from a conceptually salient   
            conceptual entity to another conceptual entity. I.e.) /πως φτάσαμε ως εδώ/ à politicians/ 
            economic situation The notion of salient/ saliency is a reference point which allows to access     
            another conceptual entity, the target.

Speakers are likely to employ hyperbole in the course of what can broadly be considered political activities. Metaphor and metonymy act as mechanisms to bring the audience to see the facts at issue in the way the speakers want them to see these facts.“When the speaker senses the possibility that the members of the audience have a value which will work to his/hers advantage, if he/she can stimulate them to experience a fantasy concerning the consequences of the facts as he/she wants them seem, the probability of hyperbole being used increases even more” (Swartz; 1976:113).

Since we are dealing with political speech the conceptualization of time and place in virtue of metonymy is grounded by the relation of a situation to the experience of the speaker. The speaker is the reference point of time and place. Temporal cognition is one aspect of conceptual structure which relates to our conceptualization of time. Unlike space, time is not a concrete or physical sensory experience. Temporal experience is both phenomenologically real and subjective. Subjective experience of time is not a single unitary phenomenon; it is compromised of experiences such as our ability to access & perceive duration, simultaneity and points of time.

The spatio-temporal anchoring of our language is not only the basis of our understanding of linguistic messages, but also the basis for anticipating certain kinds of linguistic messages. We locate entities and situations spatially and each of these expressions carries a different degree of explicitness in the encoding referents of the world. Explicitness incorporates the weighted relevance of various conceived elements of the situation with respect to the communicative intent of the speaker.

Talmy (1983) and Langacker (1986, 1988) observed that the way we locate objects with respect to one another involves the recognition of some kind of asymmetrical relation between the object we want to locate and the object with respect to which we locate it. According to them, asymmetrical relations are recognized with respect to size, containment, support, orientation, order, direction, distance, motion, or a combination of these. For Svorou (1993) a spatial-arrangement of two entities may be described in a number of ways, each of which constitutes a ‘construal’.

Examples:

1. "Εμείς είμαστε εδώ και θα παραμείνουμε εδώ, ενώ εσείς είστε και θα παραμείνετε εκεί"

/ekei/ in this context means ‘away from’; according to Talmy it refers to the motion of a schematically Figure along a path that progressively increases its distance from a schematically pointlike Ground. 

2. «Πώς φτάσαμε ως εδώ»

The utterance is a part of a political debate in the Hellenic Parliament. One representative of a political party elaborates on argumentation against the insufficient politics of the other political party. Despite the fact that the intended referent is not explicitly mentioned (the politician instead of using the personal pronoun, uses edo) the conveyed message is understood by the hearer since, a new politial conversation arised [Μιλάτε εσείς για το πώς φτάσαμε εδώ]

Thus, Time and Space are the starting points to conceptualize the metonymic uses of /edo/ & /ekei/. We cannot separate time from space in order to argue for metonymic alteration. The dominant image schema is that of container, part-whole and vice versa, diversion and splitting since the examples were drawn from political debates between the representatives of the political parties in the Hellenic Parliament. 

This brief paper is a part of a conference presentation, which will take place in Belgium, 2011.