This paper attempts to propose that idiomatic
expressions, and particularly, English phrasal verbs are grounded in metonymy,
and then extend into more metaphoric readings. It will be argued that speakers
firstly conceptualize the metonymic dimension of English phrasal verbs and at a
secondary point their metaphoric one. Hence, the metaphoric readings of English
phrasal verbs are subject to a continuum from metonymy to metaphor according to
their degree of fixedness. The study combines Dirven’s (2002)
proposal arguing for an extension from metonymy to metaphor with Goosens’s
(2002) argument pointing at the interaction of the two cognitive processes.
More precisely, Dirven (2002) argues for a continuum on the basis of Jacobson’s
(1971) metonymic and metaphoric poles suggesting that metonymy and metaphor are
two different conceptual strategies, as the former is purely syntagmatic, while
the latter purely paradigmatic. Under this proposal Dirven (2002) argued for
three types of metonymies: linear, non-linear conjunctive (broadening of
meaning at the linguistic level) and inclusive (allowing the extension from
metonymic to more metaphoric meanings). On the other hand, Goosens (2002) argued
for the interaction of the two cognitive processes in expressions of linguistic
action. In particular, he introduced four cases of interaction: i) metaphor
from metonymy (i.e., say something/ speak/ talk with one’s tongue in one’s
cheek), ii) metonymy within metaphor (i.e., bite one’s tongue off, shoot
one’s mouth off), iii) metaphor within metonymy (i.e. be/get up on one’s
legs), and iv) demetonymisation on a metaphorical context (i.e. service
by means of the lips only).
As a consequence, it will be argued that in the
case of English phrasal verbs even if metonymy remains dominant, it cannot be
that easily distinguished from metaphor. Adopting Barcelona’s (2002) observations
on the interaction of the two processes at the conceptual level and their
co-instantiation in the same linguistic expression, I will attempt to propose
that there is a continuum from the most prototypical instances to other more
marginal and hence, non-metonymic. After all, this type of interaction shows
that extended meanings are not “amendable to characterization as either
exclusively metaphors or exclusively metonymies with respect to their root
meaning” and as a result we may speak of a case of “metaphtonymy” as Riemer (2002: 381) claims, or as a case of
meta-metonymy as I will attempt to explain.
